When Are We Going To DO SOMETHING?!
Mailbag #1: Revolution, Ethnopluralism, Russia in a united Europe?
It’s time for the first edition of the mailbag. The question I will be devoting most time to this week is one I’ve been seeing for years - when are people like me going to stop talking and DO SOMETHING?
If you’d like to have your question answered in the next installment, leave a comment below.
American Idiot asks: What is to be done?
Democracy means rule by the demos, the people. It is not a set of procedures such as elections, parliaments, courts, and a free press. It is a condition in which an actual people, coherent enough to recognize itself as the thing doing the governing, controls the state it built. The procedures sit downstream of the people. Where there is no demos, there is no democracy, however many votes are counted. Nationalism and democracy are therefore the same thing. A demos is a nation, and a nation governing itself through its own state is what democracy has always been, from Athens through Rome through the pre-1965 American republic through the functioning nation-states of the present. Every durable democracy guarded the boundary of its demos, because a people that loses control of who belongs loses control of the state.
Augustus did not abolish the Roman Republic. He hollowed it while preserving its appearance. The Senate still met, the consuls were still elected, and the vocabulary of res publica still conferred legitimacy, but the Senate ratified what Augustus had already decided, the consuls executed what he had directed, and the elections were held on schedule while the people who voted in them believed they still lived in the Republic. The conversion was administrative, gradual, and dressed in the language of restoration. The shell continued while the people’s actual control of their state was removed. By the time the demos understood what had happened, the Republic was gone. This is the cleanest demonstration in the historical record of how a nation state is replaced by an empire while keeping the procedure of the thing it replaced.
Today the European nations face a far more sophisticated empire led by the international Jewish coalition to name a few, The Anti-Defamation League, B’nai B’rith, the American Jewish Committee, The American Jewish Congress, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, The National Council of Jewish Women, the NCRAC is the institutional ancestor of the contemporary Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. The same coordination architecture that ran the 1965 Hart-Celler campaign runs, with the same continuity, the institutional position on every American foreign and domestic policy question to the present day. Across the Atlantic, you have the Open Society Foundation and the World Economic Forum two pillars of international Jewish governance in Europe. All of this and it doesn’t even touch the organization downstream these groups influence or control, so again I ask, what is to be done?
Another post on X? another Substack? Another podcast? We have the people and the momentum they must be organized and put to work. The problem the movement currently has isn’t the amount of people, we have reached numbers this movement hasn’t had since the early 20th century. Many commentators, such as Nick Fuentes, seem to have no plan or ideas on where to go. They vehemently advocate against organizing due to the fear of being arrested or even killed. I ask you how could we expect nothing less, imprisonment and death are the price for the continuation of our people. The people of this movement must come to these terms, they are fighting for something far greater than their own lives, do nothing and you will by the end of your easy lives see your nations cease to exist in any meaningful way. The English will be a minority in the land that bears their name, the Germans will be a minority in the land they’ve called home for over 3000 years, there will be no European countries left, not in some distant future but in our lifetimes. So my question is, what is to be done?
What is to be done is we are to continue to make metapolitical and cultural change, shift the bounds of acceptable discourse, build our own institutions and parties, and acquire as much power as possible.
I see posts like these all the time, and they feel a lot like grandstanding and self-pity. Yes, our political enemies have many institutions and great power. Yes, it will be very difficult to unseat them from power. But repeatedly emphasising how lopsided the power dynamics are, as if that suggests the only answer is violence, is dishonest. If anything, people engaging in violence when institutional power is so monopolised by their political enemies only makes it more futile and counter-productive, since the existing power-brokers can respond and manage in a way that strengthens their grip on power.
But we should not mistake institutional size for health. The present order looks powerful because it occupies every commanding height of society. But ideologically, it is exhausted. Liberalism no longer offers a believable account of the common good, national loyalty, or even basic public order. It survives increasingly through overt censorship, managerial inertia, and the fear people have of saying obvious things aloud. This means that, for all the powerful institutions you listed, their greatest weakness is still in the realm of ideas — their increasing inability to manufacture consensus.
It is a silly false dichotomy then, to say things like “Another post on X? another Substack? Another podcast?” Yes, actually. Politics is shaped by people, and those people’s ideas are shaped by media. Almost all of the nationalist right’s gains in recent years have come by changing people’s minds through digital media.
At every point in the last ten years, I’ve seen the same people say we have reached our limit online and now is the time to DO SOMETHING. They said it after the censorship of 2017, when the black pillers wanted us to accept defeat over the online space, let our enemies control discourse, and switch to marching around in costumes. They said it during COVID, even though the years after saw a huge growth in nationalist ideas. When I told people to take advantage of the freer environment brought about by Elon Musk’s acquisition of X, I was attacked by the same people for taking people away from DOING SOMETHING. But shortly after my return to the platform, the attention a post of mine received made Irish hate speech laws a topic of debate in this country, and a campaign mostly coordinated online made the laws so unpopular that the government quietly dropped them. Then, I was told that we would be allowed some controlled pushback on the excesses of the left, but we were playing into the enemy’s hands, who would ensure discussion of the bigger issues of Jewish and Zionist influence could never be normalised. Then our #BanTheADL campaign became the top trend on Twitter, and the aftermath of October 7 red pilled millions of people on these topics. Meanwhile, there has been a normalisation of ideas like “remigration” to the point that official U.S. government accounts regularly promote the idea. More recently, the murder of Henry Nowak only became a national scandal in Britain because of the online backlash.
None of this is a substitute for organising, and everyone acknowledges that these kinds of changes will mean nothing if they do not have a lasting impact on the world outside the internet. But that is where people’s minds are shaped, and the biggest part of our task is undoing decades of leftist brainwashing against our ideas. Posting is not a substitute for organising, but the way to convince people of that isn’t to tell them that it’s a hindrance, either. The normies you want to reach are online. The capable people you want to organise with are online.
We do need organisation, but we need to be very clear about what organisation means. It does not mean a handful of alienated young men convincing themselves that politics is only real when it involves danger or theatrical confrontation. Serious organisation means building durable structures that survive censorship, personality drama and the normal exhaustion that comes with political life.
It means local groups. Reading circles, activist networks, social clubs, churches, schools, media outlets, legal funds, donor networks, professional associations. It also means networking professionals and people with skills, as well as finding people willing to do unglamorous work consistently.
It will also necessarily mean some level of entryism in existing institutions. Some people should build explicitly nationalist organisations, but others can have greater influence joining existing institutions and shifting their culture from within. Politics is not confined to elections or parties. It is shaped by the people who sit on committees, manage budgets, train younger members, hire staff, and set the informal moral atmosphere of an institution. The left understood this very well. It did not merely win public arguments; it embedded itself in the machinery of social life.
What will not help is encouraging potentially influential young men to throw their lives away in some fatalistic act of rage, or politically neutralising people by telling them “there is no political solution.” This rhetoric usually comes from people who are so black pilled that they contribute nothing to nationalist movements, and are convinced only some spontaneous deluge of violence, carried out by someone other than themselves, will remedy things. I believe this is immoral, but I also believe it’s wholly counter-productive to what the people promoting it want.
I have written before about why this fantasy of a right-wing revolt is so divorced from reality:
Don't Bet on Civil War
This essay was originally published in my book Nationalism: The Politics of Identity.
My basic argument is that we know a lot about how revolutions and civil war happen, and they require elite defection, state weakness, mass immiseration, organisation, and favourable geopolitical conditions, none of which exist for the nationalist right in the West. One thing our regimes are very good at is crushing armed movements, and the whole machinery of Western surveillance states has been directed towards managing the massively exaggerated threat of far-right violence now for decades. Violence would not only fail; it would give the regime exactly the pretext it wants for repression, censorship, financial deplatforming, surveillance expansion, and the destruction of any serious nationalist infrastructure.
Of course, the questioner says “how could we expect nothing less, imprisonment and death are the price for the continuation of our people,” but were he serious, he wouldn’t be posting such sentiments online where the security services could easily monitor him. The people who post these sentiments are almost never serious. They have an online profile telling other people online that their being online is a waste of time and they should DO SOMETHING, while they themselves wait for others to DO SOMETHING for them.
So yes, another post. Another podcast. Another article. Another campaign. Another local meeting. Another institution. Another candidate. Another business. Another school. Another family. Another donor. Another organiser. Another person persuaded who yesterday thought our ideas were unthinkable. That is how power is built. We need to gather more people who are serious about the business of building power and stop taking seriously people who demoralise in order to promote their own unrealistic solutions.
In the rest of this week’s mailbag: is ethnopluralism the way forward for Europe? Should Russia be part of a united Europe? How do we deal with fake populists? What’s the proper amount of immigration and is “integration” actually possible?
ArmUndHammer asks: Do you think ethno-pluralist democracy is a good model for Europe? Is the main goal of the identitarian revolution to convince western elites and parties to take up remigration politics? Conservative parties such as CDU seem to have taken these positions (as Merz has in Germany) to repatriate a considerable amount of foreign born asylum seekers, could this be promising together with a larger identitarian shift?
For readers unaware, ethnopluralism is a term to come out of the French New Right, for a politics built on “the right to difference." The idea is that distinct peoples and cultures should not be dissolved into a universal liberal order, but encouraged to preserve their own identity, territory, and institutions. This is a kind of radical multipolarity, with the French New Right imagining Muslim enclaves in French cities having a large degree of self-rule and segregation, with White self-rule in turn respected.
My answer would be: yes, ethnopluralist democracy is a better model for Europe than liberal multiculturalism, but it is certainly not the ideal. Both ethnopluralism and nationalism start from the recognition of important truths: that ethnic differences are meaningful, that diversity in proximity creates conflict, and that the solution is not attempting to socially engineer away cultural differences between ethnic groups, but separation.
The ideal is a society with a coherent demos: a historic majority, a shared culture, and a high degree of ethnic and civilisational continuity. Even most of the advocates of ethnopluralism would recognise this, but they do not believe a return to the ethnically coherent nation-states of a generation prior is now possible. That may be true in France. It may yet turn out to be true in many European countries, but as long as there is a feasible route to reverse mass-immigration through politics I think that is where our goals should be focused. But where diversity is already a hard political fact, ethnopluralist arrangements are preferable to liberal multiculturalism, not least because “integration” would only make it more difficult to reverse disastrous immigration policies in the future.
On the identitarian revolution, the goal is bigger than persuading conservative parties to deport more asylum seekers. That is part of it, but the deeper objective is metapolitical: to make it legitimate again to say that European peoples have collective interests and rights, including the right to remain majorities in their own homelands. The moves by parties like the CDU are really only promising insofar as they reflect that deeper shift.
Fin asks: Kudos on the book Napoleon’s Final Reflections. I loved it.
I just wanted to ask: how do we, on the nationalist side, politically thwart the Farage types in this country?
By that I mainly mean the party Independent Ireland. To any informed observer, its four TDs are all either part of the Fianna Fáil/Fine Gael gene pool or closely adjacent to it.
Contrast this with the United Kingdom, where Farage does get pushback and is labelled a “civic nationalist,” while the spectre of Rupert Lowe and Restore Britain looms large enough to force Reform UK into adopting more genuinely populist positions.
Unfortunately, we do not really have a mainstream platform capable of calling these people out. I see them as a huge barrier to The National Party, because they know exactly what they are doing: hoovering up the populist vote while posing as something they are not.
Add to this your excellent term “slopulism.” At election time, we will also have the usual cranks with no coherent strategy beyond shouting “globalist” at Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.
You use the example of Farage, and I think it’s useful here because his rhetoric has been a lot better lately over the death of Henry Nowak. Did Nigel suddenly have an awakening? No, but he feels Rupert Lowe and Restore breathing down his neck. Restore supporters have aggressively attacked Reform on not being committed to doing things their base wants, like mass-deportations.
As you say, there is not something on Restore or Lowe’s level in Ireland yet. But just a few years ago in Britain, there wasn’t even a Reform UK. The nationalist right has become more of a force in the conversation in Ireland, and this is largely due to, and still limited to, the online space. We should continue to build this up and establish a coherent set of demands. There will be energy there that can be taken advantage of by more moderate politicians, but the demand will grow for something more radical as our voices grow.
In the longer run, the task is to occupy the ground between fake populism and crank anti-politics. That means being more radical than Independent Ireland on fundamentals, but also more competent and legible to ordinary people than the crank fringe of Boomer anti-politics.
In the case of Independent Ireland specifically, it’s an extraordinarily Boomer-coded party that wants to do things like scrap property taxes for the elderly — one of the worst conceivable policies anyone could propose right now. They have also gone out of their way to distance themselves from nationalism or principled opposition to immigration, so it shouldn’t be difficult to show disillusioned voters their vision of Ireland is much more of the same.
Vic asks: Do you see Russia as a part of the unified Europe that you envision?
Well first of all, I do not think Europe should be “unified” in the sense of a single centralised empire, Brussels-led or otherwise. My ideal is a Europe of nations and peoples: internally sovereign, civilisationally conscious, and capable of cooperation where interests align.
Proposals For A New European Union
In my last essay, I argued a push to abolish the EU from nationalists could be counter-productive to our project, and that abolition isn’t a very realistic prospect anyway. I also briefly sketched what an alternative vision of the European Union could look like.
Russians are racially European, and Russia is part of the wider European world, but not necessarily part of the same institutional structure as Western or Central Europe. Russia is its own great power, with its own civilisational identity and strategic interests. It should be treated as a European power, not as an Asiatic enemy to be endlessly contained, but also not romanticised as if its interests are automatically identical with ours.
And of course, Russia’s ethnic composition also complicates this question. Unlike most European nation-states, Russia is not simply a European people with a state. It is a vast multi-ethnic federation, spanning Europe and Asia, with large Turkic, Siberian, and Muslim populations. That does not make Russia “non-European,” but it does make it a difficult candidate for any common European political structure. A unified Europe based on civilisational and ethnic continuity cannot simply absorb a Eurasian empire without importing all of its internal diversity and geopolitical contradictions. Because Russia is a federation of many peoples rather than a nation-state in the strict sense, it will always have strong incentives to reject ethnonational or identitarian politics internally, or closer ties with a confidently European political project, since applying that logic consistently would threaten the cohesion of the Russian state itself.
Eisen asks: Avid listener of Fuentes and Spencer. I’m sure you’ve noticed they aren’t the biggest fans of Russia. With Russia being a largely White nation and unimpeded by massive levels of immigration - I’m not sure I understand the lukewarm attitude in Nick’s case and the hostility in Richard’s.
I’m not a cheerleader for the Russian state - but their positions on this is perplexing to me. Any thoughts?
Also, your new book was great.
Glad you enjoyed the book!
In the case of Nick, he recently explained his feelings on that topic here. Essentially, he’s not hostile to Russia, but he is very skeptical of Russian interference in the American right.
As for Spencer, I don’t think he has a very rigorous worldview, and he tends to base a lot of his opinions on what he thinks seems more intellectual and counter to the conservative chuds he detests. 10 years ago, it seemed quite vogue and continental to invoke the works of Dugin and critique liberal internationalism in Eastern Europe.
Now, Putin is generally admired by low-information rightists, and the kind of European federalist, Macron enjoying, alt-progressives who Spencer vibes with very anti-Russia, so I think this turn was inevitable. At the start of the Ukraine War, Spencer was going on streams arguing that a bipolar conflict between the West and Russia/the third world would somehow awaken a European civilisational spirit, and dissidents like himself could somehow become accepted and even influential figures within that new paradigm so long as they were very committed to the West’s efforts against Russia. Obviously, that hasn’t really come to pass. But Spencer has still come to identify more with “the West,” with the multipolarity discourse coming from pro-Russia circles being the antithesis of the kind of progressive super-imperialism he idealises.
Lucius asks: Are you aware of any attempts to address the rate at which a nation can absorb immigrants without sacrificing its social cohesion and demographic identity? I have seen in your writings citations to Aristotle’s position on the ideal *size* of a society, and I think you tweeted not long ago about being open to limited immigration into Ireland if it were limited to Europeans and on certain terms. But I don’t think I’ve seen anyone attempt to address on a scientific or sociological basis the degree to which a society can absorb foreign peoples without sacrificing its identity so to speak.
I think this is a much needed issue to address in the nationalist movement. Too many people are uncomfortable with the nationalist position simply because they believe it prohibits integration on any level whatsoever. Simply identifying a reasonable scientific or sociological basis that permits some limited degree of “integration” would make the nationalist position far more credible and attract more adherents.
What about basing an immigration policy on the sociological phenomenon of the rule of 150? Roughly speaking, it seems to be a sociological phenomenon in which the ideal group size for close, personal social cohesion is about 150 people. Think of a company in the military context like Easy Company in Band of Brothers. Beyond 150 people, it becomes harder to truly know a person on a personal level.
Perhaps one could fashion an approach to immigration based around such a principle? One new member of a society per 150 citizens per generation. Coupled with strong general assimilation pressures, visa restrictions to ensure newcomers are not coalescing in a given area, and possibly even various civil rights granted to newcomers over time or even across generations might be an effective approach.
I would love to see someone tackle this issue. I can think of no better person than you. Fleshing out this issue even a little bit would really help ground the nationalist position and make it more palatable to a lot of people.
On the last point, you’re in luck — I am actually writing a book on this very subject right now. It will cover the ideal size of states, the history of small states, theories of localism and decentralisation, and a vision for a more decentralised future.
As for assimilation, the basic principle should be that immigration is permissible only when it does not challenge the identity or cohesion of the host nation. The burden of proof should be on those proposing immigration to show that it can meet that standard.
Now, I happen to think maintaining an adequate standard of living in a modern, highly complex economies like ours does require the exchange of labour through immigration. This is where recognising race is important. If we are honest about it, then we will recognise that the immigrants will be least disruptive to their host country if they are of the same race. For European countries, this means they should prioritise other European immigrants. It would even be advisable for North European countries like Ireland to give further priority to selecting among other, more genetically similar North Europeans rather than Southern Europeans.
I do not think we can place an exact universal number on how many immigrants a country can take per year. That depends on the national interest, the condition of the host society, the type of immigration, and whether the arrangement is temporary or permanent. But as a rough ceiling, a modern Western country might be able to tolerate something like 5–10% of its workforce as guest workers, provided they are genuinely temporary, politically subordinate, geographically dispersed, and drawn from culturally proximate populations. Once the figure rises much above 10%, it begins to cease being a marginal labour supplement and becomes a demographic fact in its own right. Ideally, a serious state would work to keep the number below 5% and reduce its dependency on foreign labour over time.
Londoner asks: More observation than request. It would be helpful to socialise the concept of ‘the open society and its victims’
Ok!
Sorel McRae asks: What is that music with which you open your podcasts?
Erik Satie — Gnossienne No.1.









Thanks for the reply Keith.
To clear some things up, violence will never lead to change this isn’t the 19th century and is not what I was getting at. Many in the States won’t even get involved with groups like American Renaissance, Return to the Land, or groups like Patriot Front and Active Clubs. Many fearing arrest or worse. My comment wasn’t meant to convey a romanticized 19th century revolution or even a 20th century. I was thinking more along the lines of the long march through the institutions and forming political groups similar to the Jewish institutions, they started this a century ago or more and slowly gained power, we however do not have a century and lack the capital, but our numbers grow daily. The comment also wasn’t an attack on you personally as you are the one who got me into nationalism, it was more so the need to organize peoples free time as this is something the progressive left is very good at. If this seemed like self pity it wasn’t meant to be we in the States are just 40 years ahead of Europe in our situation. Also I’m looking forward to your new book, “Nationalism: The Politics of Identity” was great and helped form much of my ideas on democracy
Hello Keith. Love your content.
America obviously has many differences in political systems, culture, and history compared to Ireland and Europe. What do you think will be the differences in approach and form of Nationalist politics in the United States, versus Europe?